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municipal court to the appellate department of the superior
court during that period. It is apparent that the subpoena
as served was too broad in some of its demands and that
compliance would have put an unnecessary burden on defendant. It should have been restricted to data which would
be relevant as having some substantial similarity to the case
at bar. The ruling of the trial court quashing this subpoena
does not, therefore, furnish a ground for reversal of the judgment, and the question in its present application need not
occur on the new trial.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is reversed and
the cause remanded for a new trial on the issue which remains open.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., Carter, ,J., Traynor, ,J., and McComb, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
My views are in accord with those expressed in the opinion
of the District Court of Appeal written by Mr. Justice Ashburn. (Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Co., (Cal.App.) 302
P.2d 877.) I would therefore modify and affirm the judgment.

[Crim. No. 5992.

In Bank.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM GERALD
MOORE, JR., Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law- Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photographs.-While evidence of colored slides picturing the victim's body in a first degree murder case should be faithful
and accurate, it was within the discretion of the trial court to
admit such pictures, particularly where the jury heard the
photographer's testimony that one transparency had a red or
orange effect from the light and type of film used, that the
objects pictured were accurately reproduced, and that the
color of the body and wounds was not distorted.
[2] !d.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photographs.-It was
not error to admit in evidence colored slides picturing the
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 226 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law,§ 524; [3] Homicide,
§58; [4] Criminal Law, § 393(1); [5] Criminal Law, § 585; [6]
Homicide, § 145(2).
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victim's body, in a first degree murder case, though a surgeon
testified that the victim died of internal injuries, where these
were caused by external blows, the nature of which appeared
from the slides, and where the pictures were such as would
aid the jury in determining the circumstances surrounding the
victim's death.
Homicide-Evidence-State of Mind of Defendant-Intent.In a prosecution for murder of a woman following a taxicab
ride, it was not prejudicial error to admit evidence concerning
defendant's earlier taxicab ride with another woman where
this evidence was relevant on the question of his intent and
purpose in picking up strange women, including the victim,
and showed that, within a relatively short time before the
victim was killed, defendant had been twice frustrated in
his desire and purpose to engage in sexual intercourse.
Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Offenses.-Evidence which
tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to
establish any fact material for the People, or to overcome
any material matter sought to be proved by the defense, is
admissible whether or not it embraces the commission of
another crime, whether or not the other crime be similar in
kind, and whether or not it be part of a single design.
Id.-Evidence~Circumstantial Evidence.-Circumstantial evidence is as sufficient to convict as direct evidence.
Homicide-Evidence.-Evidence in a homicide case showing
defendant's desire and purpose to have sexual intercourse
with the woman killed, her refusal to go to a van for that
purpose, the nature of the injuries to her body when found
near the van, and the fact that her clothing had been torn
off sustained an implied finding that defendant had killed
her in the course of an attempted rape, which killing, under
the felony murder doctrine (Pen. Code, § 189), constituted
first degree murder.

APPEAr_. (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
f>Ubd. (b)) from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County and from an order denying a new trial.
Carl B. Hilliard, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 28 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§ 323 et seq.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 310 et seq.
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,John C. McCarthy and Theo. G. Krumm, under
ment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant.

appoint~

Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, Raymond lVL Momboisse, Deputy
Attorney General, Lowell E. Lathrop, District Attorney (San
Bernardino), and J. Steve Williams, Deputy District Attorney,
for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity to the charge of murdering one Hulda
Hoag. 'rhe jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree and fixed the penalty at death. Defendant withdrew his
insanity plea and, after his motion for new trial had been
denied, the death penalty was imposed. 'l'he appeal is automatic under section 1239, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code.
Mrs. Hoag was killed at some time between 8 and 11 o'clock
on the evening of March 16, 1956. In the afternoon of that
day defendant, a 33-year-old carnival worker, left a bar in
San Bernardino with a woman (not Mrs. Hoag), and the
couple entered a taxicab. They discussed whether they should
go to a motel or the woman's house, and she gave the driver
her address. Defendant argued with the woman when she
said he could not enter her home, and he refused to pay the
fare since there was "nothing in it" for him. He left the
taxicab and was finally given a ride back to the downtown area
by policemen who had investigated the incident.
Defendant entered another tavern about 5o 'clock that afternoon, had several beers, and struck up a conversation with
Mrs. Hoag, who was 62 years old. Their friendship apparently
ripened quickly, and he invited her to come and live with
him. By 7 :30, hugging and kissing had led to more intimate
advances. Because of this and because Mrs. Hoag had become ill, the bartender asked the couple to leave and called
a taxicab for them.
The driver of this vehicle testified that defendant instructed
him to drive to the location of the carnival trailers at the
National Orange Show. During the trip, which lasted about
half an hour, defendant continued "making love to" Mrs.
Hoag. At about 8 o'clock the driver left the couple near a
field where the trailers were parked and saw them cross a
cable and enter the field. Both had obviously been drinking
and Mrs. Hoag, who was staggering, was assisted by defendant.
Defendant testified that he and Mrs. Hoag then sat on the
running board of a truck and drank from a bottle which he had
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with him; that they ''started playing aronnd a little like we
did in that bar"; and that the~' "got into a little argument!'
He told her that the,\' ''had to sleep in the van,'' as he ''didn't
make the kind of money to sleep in a hotel." Mrs. Hoag rrfused to ,;leep in the vau, and he told hPr ''You are just as
bad as the other woman that was in the taxicab after me previous to that.''
A carnival worker who was sleeping in one of the vans
heard a woman's voice say "Don't do this," or "Oh, don't do
this to me.'' He also heard a sound of scraping which seemed
to come from the vicinity of an adjoining van. He did not
believe that the voice he heard showed distress, and he did
not disturb himself.
Shortly before 11 that evening another carnival worker discovered Mrs. Hoag's nude body in a field near the trailers
and summoned officers. The body was cold, with only slight
warmth between the head and shoulders where they were
pressed together. There was no pulse. Her clothing and
personal effects were scattered over and near the trailers. A
pass to a roller derby was also discovered in the vicinity.
Mrs. Hoag had been severely beaten. Her breastbone and
eight ribs had been fractured. The body was scratched and
bruised but she had died, according to the autopsy surgeon,
from shock and hemorrhages from internal injuries. These
injmies were caused by blows which could have been administered by a fist, knee, or shod foot. There was no testimony
showing that Mrs. Hoag had been actually raped, but the
surgeon did testify that there were contusions on the outer
section of the sex organs and bruises and scratches on the
front surface of the thighs.
Black and white photographs and colored slides, showing
the body as it was found and also showing the general area,
were admitted in evidence. 'rhey were used by the surgeon
and other witnesses while explaining the victim's injuries
and the scene of the crime.
Footprints were found near the trailers. A footprint expert testified that defendant was wearing shoes that could
have made the prints. Defendant was questioned and thereafter arrested. Pictures of footprints made by defendant after
his arrest were compared with footprints found at the scene.
The prints were similar.
A criminologist testified that while there were several spots
of human blood on the trousers which defendant wore on
March 16, their areas were too small to identify the type of
the blood. No seminal spots were found on defendant's cloth-
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ing nor were any identifiable fingerprints discovered on the
items found at the scene of the killing. There were two small
tears on defendant's trousers, near the hip pockets. These
could have been made if defendant had backed into a barbed
wire fence near the trailers while dragging the body to the
place where it was found.
Defendant sought to quit his job the morning after the
killing but was told that he could not leave until the carnival
closed. His employer testified that defendant did not tell him
why he wanted to quit. The employer admitted that he had
previously spoken to defendant's former employers who may
have stated that they would have liked to have defendant
work for them again.
Defendant told a deputy sheriff, and again stated on crossexamination, that he had served a sentence in Iowa for rape.
The sheriff testified that he asked defendant after his arrest why he had killed Mrs. Hoag and defendant replied, "I
don't know why I did it," that he did not want to hurt anyone
and that "I don't remember. I blacked out. I can't remember anything.'' The sheriff also testified that defendant later
sought to plead guilty to second degree murder and stated
that he remembered more than he had told the officers but if
he told them more he ''would burn for sure.''
Defendant testified that he had been drinking beer and
whiskey all afternoon on March 16, that he met Mrs. Hoag at
the bar and gave her a roller derby pass, and that he brought
her to the carnival trailers near the fair grounds. He decided,
he said, that they had drunk too much to visit the fair itself
or to have intercourse; and when she objected to sleeping in
one of the carnival vans, they argued and he left her. He
stated that he then went to a tavern in Colton with a fellow
employee for more drinks, returned to the carnival, went to
sleep in the cab of a truck at the carnival, and awoke the next
morning on a carrousel.
Defendant also testified that his employer knew he wished
to quit because his former employers had offered him a better
job. He stated that he told the sheriff. "I didn't do it. If I
did, I didn't know I did.'' He also testified that the sheriff
had tried to convince him that he should plead guilty to second
degree murder but he refused.
On cross-examination defendant admitted that he had lied
during preliminary questioning by sheriff's deputies when
he told them that he had returned to the fair grounds during
the afternoon of March 16.
48 C.2d-18
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Defendant's only other witness >vas a woman who also
worked at the earnival. Shf' <~orrohorated one phase of his
testimony by stating that she was with defendant when be
tore his trousers while repairing the carnival equipment.
[1] Defendant eontends that ttw trial court eommitted
prejudicial error in admitting in evidence the three colored
slides picturing the victim's body. While the photographer
testified that one transparency had a red or orange effect from
the light and the type of film used, he also stated that the
objects pictured were accurately reproduced and that the
color of the body and wounds was not distorted. \Vhile such
evidence should be faithful and accurate (People v. Goodwin,
9 Cal.2d 711, 714 [72 P.2d 551] ), it was within the discretion
of the trial court to admit the pictures, particularly when the
jury had heard the testimony as to the color and its causes.
(See People v. Burwell, 44 Cal.2d 16, 34 [279 P.2d 744].)
[2] Defendant also argues that the transparencies were irrelevant since the surgeon testified that Mrs. Hoag died of
internal injuries. These were caused, however, by the external
blows, the nature of which appeared from the transparencies.
The introduction of photographs showing the body of the
victim has been disapproved "where no useful purpose is
served thereby" (People v. Sisson, 1 Cal.2d 510, 511 [36 P.2d
116]), but the pictures here were such as would aid the jury
in determining the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Hoag's
death. (See People v. Osborn, 37 Cal.2d 380, 383 [231 P.2d
850]; People v. Dunn, 29 Cal.2d 654, 659 [177 P.2d 553].)
[3] Defendant next contends that it was prejudicial error
to admit the evidence concerning his afternoon taxicab ride
with another woman. However, this evidence of defendant's
earlier activities was relevant on the question of his intent
and purpose in picking up strange women, including Mrs.
Hoag. Thus the evidence showed that, within a relatively
short time before Mrs. Hoag was killed, defendant had been
twice frustrated in his obvious desire and purpose to engage in
sexual intercourse. It could therefore be reasonably inferred
from all the evidence that defendant had been aroused to
the point of using force and that he did use force in attempting to accomplish his purpose with Mrs. Hoag.
[ 4] "The general teRts of the admissibility of evidence in
a criminal case are: . . . does it tend logically, naturally, and
by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material for the
people, or to overcome any material matter sought to be
proved by the defense~ If it does, then it is admissible,
whether it embraces the commission of another crime or does
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not, whether the other crime be similar in kind or not, whether
it be part of a single design or not." (People v. Sanders, 114
Cal. 216, 230 [46 P. 153) ; see also People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d
306, 315 [169 P.2d 924), and cases cited.)
Defendant's final contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. [5] It is true that the evidence is largely circumstantial, but such evidence ''is as
sufficient to convict as direct evidence." (People v. Reed, 38
Cal.2d 423, 431 [240 P.2d 590).)
[6] Defendant argues that even if there is sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of murder, the circumstances
surrounding the murder are undisclosed, and therefore the
verdict should be murder of the second degree. (People v.
Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385].)
Here, however, the testimony, including that showing defendant's obvious desire and purpose to have sexual intercourse
with Mrs. Hoag, her refusal to go to the van for that purpose,
the nature of the injuries to her body when found near the
van, and the fact that her clothing had been torn off, was
sufficient evidence to sustain the implied finding that defendant had killed her in the course of an attempted rape. (People
v. Lewis, 220 Cal. 510 [31 P.2d 357] ; People v. Wheelock,
6 Cal.Unrep. 914 [68 P. 579].) Such a killing, under the
felony murder doctrine (Pen. Code, § 189), constitutes first
degree murder.
Defendant makes no complaint concerning the instructions. The jury was properly instructed on the elements of
rape, attempted rape, and the felony murder doctrine. There
was ample evidence to sustain the verdict of first degree murder under that doctrine.
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,T., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, ,T.-I dissent.
I do not agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the
judgment of conviction of first degree murder; I also am of
the opinion that the evidence concerning defendant's conduct
earlier in the day of the crime could have had no other object,
or effect, than to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the
JUry.

Even the People do "not stress the argument" that defendant was guilty of premeditated, deliberate and wilful murder,
but argue that this was a killing committed in the attempt to
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commit, or the actual perpetration of, rape. There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever in the record to support this
latter theory: The victim willingly engaged in making love,
and permitting the defendant to make love to her; she went
with him voluntarily with the expressed purpose of having
sexual intercourse with him-not only that night, but in the
future since she intended to live with him and tentative
arrangements were made for another patron of the bar to take
her and the defendant to her home and pick up her belongings
the following Sunday morning.
The testimony concerning the defendant's and victim's
supposed presence at the trailer when the victim was overheard to say "Don't do this" or "Oh, don't do this to me"
was expressly stated by the witness to be that the woman did
not seem to be in any distress and "wasn't screaming, anything like that." The witness testified that he didn't hear a
man's voice; that for a few seconds he heard something like
scraping against tin. Defendant testified that when the victim
refused to sleep in the trailer with him that he got up and
left her, fully clothed, and walked alone toward the show
grounds where he met a coworker who went with him to
another bar; that he later returned to the show and woke up
the next morning on a merry-go-round without knowing how
he got there.
The evidence directly linking defendant with the crime is
almost nonexistent: He was identified as the man who was
last seen walking to the trailers with the victim. There was
no evidence on his clothing except two tears on his pants'
pockets, which were proved to have occurred at an earlier
time; and two unidentifiable minute blood spots on the back
of one pants' leg. There were no blood stains on his shoes,
no scrapings from under his nails connecting him with the
victim; the only prints from his shoes were in the spot where
he had been last seen with the woman when she was alive.
There was nothing on defendant's clothing suggesting he had
either raped, or killed, the woman. Circumstantial evidence
and each link in the chain of circumstantial evidence must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime with which he was charged, and, furthermore, each
link of that chain of circumstantial evidence must be irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion (People v.
Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144 [146 P.2d 469]; People v. Rayol,
65 Cal.App.2d 462 [150 P.2d 812] ; People v. Koenig, 29
Cal.2d 87 [173 P.2d 1]).
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In considering the applicable law, it should be noted that
a woman's voice was heard, but that the one hearing the words
did not consider that she was in distress; no man's voice was
heard; no violent sounds were heard; no signs were found on
defendant's clothing or hands which would even suggest he
had committed the crime. The only evidence linking defendant with the victim is that they had set out together with the
avowed purpose of engaging, voluntarily, in sexual intercourse; that they had been engaged in drinking, and making
love, publicly for some time; that they were seen walking
together toward the trailers. There was ample evidence in
the record that other men and women slept in the trailers,
and outside of them.
With respect to the evidence as to defendant's conduct on
the afternoon of the day of the crime, its only purpose could
have been to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury.
The general rule is that such evidence is inadmissible. There
is an exception to the rule that such evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issues in the case (People v. Evans,
113 Cal.App.2d 124, 126 [247 P.2d 915]). The primary theory
on which this case was tried was that defendant killed his
victim in the attempt to commit rape, or in the actual commission of rape. 'l'he evidence complained of concerned the
woman with whom defendant had left the bar earlier in the
day. After she and the defendant arrived at her home, where
he had expected to have intercourse with her, she refused to
let him in the house. He then refused to pay the cab driver
and was taken back into town by the police. From this the
majority infers that defendant was aroused to the point of rape
by force and violence due to the frustration of his sexual
desires. Even though I am of the opinion that the evidence
was inadmissible for any purpose since it showed only defendant's desire for sexual intercourse and had nothing whatsoever
to do with either rape, or murder, since both women were
apparently quite willing to go with defendant, its prejudicial
effect upon the jury cannot be discounted. With the first
woman's refusal to comply with defendant's wishes, he merely
left her and refused to pay the taxi fare. There is nothing in
this evidence which has any bearing on the issues of intent to
commit rape with force and violence, or intent to kill, or a
killing committed in the attempt to perpetrate, or the commission of rape. In other words, to support murder of the
first degree under the theory that it was committed in the
attempt to commit, or the commission of, rape, the evidence
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must show Pither lack of eonsent, or the use of force and violence in the commission of the act. ~When the conduct of the
parties here is eonsidered, it is apparent that there was no
laek of eonsent on the part of the vietim beeause she was with
the defendant for the purpose of having intereourse with
him. 'fhis is also true of the other woman who, apparently,
later ehanged her mind. There was, however, no intimation
that her ehange of mind caused any violence, or threat of violenee, on defendant's part. Inasmuch as he was charged with
murder of the first degree on the theory that he committed
said killing in the attempt to commit rape, or the commission
thereof, it is difficult for me to see how the evidence could have
been considered admissible on any theory. It is clear, however, that the effect of it was to prove to the jury that the
defendant was a "bad" and "immoral" man capable of any
crime and since he was the last one to be seen with her, even
though she was with him voluntarily and willingly, and even
though there was no further evidence linking him with the
killing that he must have been the guilty one.
I would reverse the judgment because I do not believe the
evidence is suffieient and because I believe that the admission
of the evidence of defendant's conduct earlier that afternoon
was prejudicially erroneous.
Traynor, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The evidence is obviously suffieient to establish a criminal homicide. It is also suggestive that
defendant is the guilty perpetrator. But it convincingly
negates, rather than proves, murder in an attempt to commit
rape. It is not suffieient to establish premeditated murder. In
the state of the record, and in the light of the errors pointed
out by Mr. Justice Carter, the eonviction, in my view, should
be reduced to murder of the second degree. Failing such action, the judgment should be reversed. Imposition of the
death penalty in a case such as this is manifestly a miscarriage of justiee and an abuse of the penalty.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4,
1957. Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

